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tcpflow 1.4 — Turns PCAP files into “transcripts”
bulk_extractor 1.4 — a feature extractor for disk images.
These tools frequently find information that’s invisible to other tools.




decoding lots of stuff








tcpflow is a command-line tool for processing streams.
Wireshark and EtherPeek look at packets
—These tools do not handle millions of packets or TCP connections




Batch operation is typical forensics:
Live-capture is useful for testing & stunts
• Run with ‘-c’ console output to see content of TCP connections as they go by.
• Output to file system and read ‘report.xml’ or use alert_fd and process each file as it is 
closed.
















tcpflow turns each side of the TCP connection into a file.
These files are then processed with standard tools.
tcpflow splits 1-N pcap files into multiple TCP connections.
• Each connection is put in two files (client ➜ server / server ➜ client)
• HTTP sessions are decompressed & exploded
Example:
$ tcpflow -a -o out-nitroba -r nitroba.pcap 
$ ls -l out-nitroba 
  3648 Jul 22  2008 004.071.104.187.00080-192.168.015.004.35950
   462 Jul 22  2008 004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35458
   138 Jul 22  2008 004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35458-HTTPBODY-001.html
   462 Jul 22  2008 004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35712
   138 Jul 22  2008 004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35712-HTTPBODY-001.html
136520 Jul 22  2008 008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822
  2550 Jul 22  2008 008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822-HTTPBODY-001.gif
  1582 Jul 22  2008 008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822-HTTPBODY-002.gif
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The filename is created from a template.
Default template: %A.%a-%B.%b%V%v%C%c
Template elements:
  %A/%a - source IP address/port
  %B/%b - dest IP address/port
  %E/%e - source/dest Ethernet Mac address
  %V/%v - VLAN number, '--' if no vlan/'' if no vlan
  %T/%t - Timestamp in ISO8601 format/unix time_t
  %c - connection_count for connections>0 
  %C - 'c' if connection_count >0
  %N - (connection_number )             % 1000
  %K - (connection_number / 1000)       % 1000
  %M - (connection_number / 1000000)    % 1000
  %G - (connection_number / 1000000000) % 1000




tcpflow automatically bins connections into directories
Default is no binning — good for less than 1,000 connections.
Specify “-Fk” to bin by “connection number”
• Prepends “%K/” to template
$ ls -lF
total 18216
    66606 Nov 26 08:04 000/
    60112 Nov 26 08:04 001/
    79628 Nov 26 08:04 002/
    66232 Nov 26 08:04 003/
        0 Nov 26 08:04 alerts.txt
    19076 Nov 26 08:04 report.pdf
 18631436 Nov 26 08:04 report.xml
$ ls -lF out-nitroba-Fk 000/*
  3648 Jul 22  2008 000/004.071.104.187.00080-192.168.015.004.35950
   462 Jul 22  2008 000/004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35458
   138 Jul 22  2008 000/004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35458-HTTPBODY-001.html
   462 Jul 22  2008 000/004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35712
   138 Jul 22  2008 000/004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35712-HTTPBODY-001.html
136520 Jul 22  2008 000/008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822
  2550 Jul 22  2008 000/008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822-HTTPBODY-001.gif
  1582 Jul 22  2008 000/008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822-HTTPBODY-002.gif
 58123 Jul 22  2008 000/008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822-HTTPBODY-003.gif
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You can bin by IP address, port #, etc.
For example, to bin by source IP address:
$ tcpflow -T%A/%a-%B.%b%V%v%C%c -a -o out3 -r nitroba.pcap
$ ls -lF out3 | head
total 17864
    102 Nov 26 08:11 004.071.104.187/
    204 Nov 26 08:11 004.078.212.029/
   1768 Nov 26 08:11 008.012.217.125/
    136 Nov 26 08:11 008.012.221.123/
    442 Nov 26 08:11 012.129.147.065/
    136 Nov 26 08:11 012.129.210.041/
    204 Nov 26 08:11 012.129.210.046/
    578 Nov 26 08:11 012.130.060.002/
    102 Nov 26 08:11 012.130.081.249/
$
—Note 1: “file size” and “mod time” are not meaningful for directories.
—Note 2: When binning by address or port, the two sides end in a different directories.
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report.xml is a DFXML file that records what tcpflow did.
There are five sections:
<creator version='1.0'>
• tcpflow build environment (OS, host, compiler, libraries) 
• tcpflow execution environment (OS, host, input, command options, etc.)
<configuration>
• Specific configuration options (e.g. tdelta)
<fileobjects>
• Each stream that was created
<summary>
• Information collected at end of run
<rusage>
• CPU & memory required by the run
9
Provenance makes it easier to use rapidly developing tools.
<build_environment>
  <compiler>4.2.1 (4.2.1 Compatible Apple LLVM 5.0 
(clang-500.2.79))</compiler>
  <compilation_date>2013-11-23T15:54:13</compilation_date>
  <library name="boost" version="105400"/>





  <os_version>Darwin Kernel Version 13.0.0: Thu Sep 19 










<fileobject> tags generated by tcpflow match fiwalk’s.
  <fileobject>
    <filename>031.013.069.160.00443-010.002.107.009.52133</filename>
    <filesize>76</filesize>




mac_saddr='00:00:cd:3b:a3:88' packets='3' srcport='443' 
dstport='52133' family='2' />
    <hashdigest type='MD5'>a1e0610d76af60000e8a0710a6bb59c6</hashdigest>
  </fileobject>
Note:
• Processing flows with XML is non-standard but relatively easy.
• 10-20GB DFXML files can be rapidly processed with dfxml.py  (SAX-based parser).
Other output options in development:
• sqlite
• Netflow? RFC5665 IPFIX?  SiLK?  FlowCollector?
11




  <byte_run file_offset='273'>
   <fileobject>
     <filename>...-HTTPBODY-001.gif</filename>
     <filesize>3964</filesize>
   </fileobject>
  </byte_run>
  <byte_run file_offset='4511'>
    <fileobject>
      <filename>...HTTPBODY-001.gif</filename>
      <filesize>5048</filesize>











You are a staff member at the Nitroba University Incident Response Team.
Lily Tuckrige is teaching chemistry CHEM109 this summer at NSU.
Tuckrige has been receiving harassing email at her personal email address.
• Tuckrige's personal email is lilytuckrige@yahoo.com
• She thinks that it is from one of the students in her class.
Tuckrige contacted IT support.
• She sent a screen shot of one of the harassing email messages.









To find out what's going on, 
Nitroba's IT sets up a packet sniffer
But multiple people were using the same IP address.
Solution: use browser finger printing.
NITROBA
State UniversityThe attack email:
NITROBA
State UniversityHow to solve this problem:
1. Map out the Nitroba dorm room network.
2. Find who sent email to lilytuckrige@yahoo.com
• Look for a TCP flow that includes the hostile message
• Find information that can tie that message to a particular web browser.
3. Identify the other TCP connections that below to the attacker
4. Find information in one of those TCP connections that IDs the attacker.
To solve the Nitroba University Harassment scenario
Run tcpflow on nitroba.pcap:
$ tcpflow -r nitroba.pcap -o out
$ ls -l out | cut -c 30- | head
    3648 Jul 22  2008 004.071.104.187.00080-192.168.015.004.35950
     462 Jul 22  2008 004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35458
     462 Jul 22  2008 004.078.212.029.00080-192.168.015.004.35712
  136520 Jul 21  2008 008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32822
   23943 Jul 21  2008 008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32824
   17995 Jul 21  2008 008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32828
   20064 Jul 21  2008 008.012.217.125.00080-192.168.015.004.32830
     879 Jul 21  2008 008.012.221.123.00080-192.168.015.004.33298








tcpflow addresses important “real-world” capture problems.
When we capture in the real-world, we see:
• 1-sided captures (from asymmetric routing)




tcpflow handles these situations.
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10/23/13, 10:22 AM
Page 1 of 1http://www.clker.com/cliparts/f/4/2/c/13498150542038624921View%20Web%20Browser%20Window.svg
We think of TCP as a stream-based protocol:
But connections are made up of packets:
tcpflow understands packets so you don’t have to.
25
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A flow is an (Source-IP, Source-Port, Dest-IP, Dest-Port) 4-tuple 























































resp35 “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped inside a mystery inside an enigma”


















w: 1000000000 “hello world!”
w: 1000000013
tcpflow can be extended and automated.
Read files or report.xml after run for post-processing.
• report.xml uses same DFXML as bulk_extractor & fiwalk
Real-time use:
• Watch report.xml (flushed when each connection is closed)
• Create a pipe and read it with alert_fd (notified on each file open & close)
cmd = "tcpflow -a -Fk -b 10485760 -S http_alert_fd=1 "+\
      "-i eth1 -o outdir tcp port 80"
tcpflow_process = 
   subprocess.Popen(shlex.split(cmd), 
                    stdout=subprocess.PIPE, 
                    stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
—Then watch stdout from tcpflow_process for files opened & closed.
31
tcpflow 1.4 uses the bulk_extractor plug-in API
Basic structure of tcpflow similar to basic structure of bulk_extractor.
• Expanded bulk_extractor API to handle call-backs for packets
• Visualization handled as another module
• Currently single-threaded









tcpflow — performance and comparison
Data set: MIT Lincoln Labs ID99 Evaluation
33
tcpflow 1.4 Wireshark 1.10.3
Time to process 
(Mac Pro)
91.1 seconds 276 seconds
Time to access each 
TCP stream <1 msec (file open time) 43 seconds
Dataset: Week 2, Tuesday, Inside
Number of Packets 1585120
Size of PCAP file: 400,104,805 bytes
Number of TCP connections: 110,978
SSL decryption issues
Options for decrypting SSL:
• Man-in-the-middle proxy (e.g. mitmproxy)
• Decryption with private key
Wireshark — decrypts SSL with private key.
tcpflow — Currently no SSL decryption
No SSL decryption with perfect forward secrecy (PFS) protocols
• Generally authenticated Diffie-Hellman
34
Presently there is poor browser support for PFS.
“The actual cipher suites used
when connecting to 2.4 Million
SSL sites with the cipher suite
settings extracted from each
browser. *
Opera does not include its 
TLS 1.2 cipher suites.





Currently PFS is not much of an issue.





11/29/2013 SSL: Intercepted today, decrypted tomorrow | Netcraft
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/06/25/ssl-intercepted-today-decrypted-tomorrow.html 2/4
The  actual  cipher  suites  used  when  connecting  to  2.4  Million  SSL  sites  with  the  cipher  suite  settings  extracted  from  each  browser.  *Opera  does  not  include
its  TLS  1.2  cipher  suites.
Internet  Explorer  does  particularly  poorly  as  it  does  not  support  any  cipher  suite  that  uses  both  RSA  public  keys  and  non-­elliptic-­curve  DH  key  exchange,
which   includes   the  most  popular  PF   cipher  suite.  The  PFS  cipher  suites   that   IE  does  support  have  a   lower  priority   than  some  of   the  most  commonly
supported  non-­PFS  cipher  suites.  Curiously,  IE  does  support  DHE-­DSS-­AES256-­SHA,  which  uses  the  rarer  DSS  authentication  method,  but  not  the  very
popular  DHE-­RSA-­AES256-­SHA.













Internet  Explorer  10's  cipher  suite  ordering  and  the  actual  negotiated  cipher  suite  in  Netcraft's  SSL  survey.  PFS  cipher  suites  are  highlighted  in  bold  and
green.
Safari  supports  many  PFS  cipher  suites  but  non-­elliptic-­curve  cipher  suites  are  used  only  as  a  last  resort.  As  several  non-­PFS  ciphers  have  a  higher  priority,
web  servers  respecting  the  browser's  preferences  will  end  up  selecting  a  non-­PFS  cipher  suite  even  if  the  web  server  itself  does  support  some  (non  elliptic-­
curve)  PFS  cipher  suites.
Chrome,  Firefox,  and  Opera  all  do  better,  preferring  PFS  cipher  suites  ahead  of  non-­PFS  at  any  given  strength  level  —  for  example  Opera's  preference  list
starts:   DHE-­RSA-­AES256-­SHA,   DHE-­DSS-­AES256-­SHA,   AES256-­SHA,   DHE-­RSA-­AES128-­SHA,   DHE-­DSS-­AES128-­SHA,   AES128-­SHA.   Netcraft   did   not
include  any  cipher  suites  only  present  in  TLS  1.2  which  includes  many  of  Opera's  PFS  cipher  suites,  so  the  results  for  Opera  form  a  lower  bound  on  the
number  of  SSL  sites  using  PFS  with  Opera.
None  of  the  browsers  change  their  user  interface  perceptibly  to  reflect  the  presence  of  PFS  akin  to  the  way  EV  certificates  are  treated  to  a  green  address
bar.  Google  Chrome  and  Opera  show  the  cipher  suite  used  (in  popups  or  dialog  boxes),  but  they  rely  on  a  user  understanding  the  implications  of  wording
such  as  "[..]  ECDHE_RSA  as  the  key  exchange  mechanism".
Web  server  support  for  PFS
Despite  a  browser's  best  efforts  to  prefer  PFS  cipher  suites,  the  key  exchange  method  used  is  selected  by  the  server  and  it  may  either  not  support  any  PFS
cipher  suites  or  it  may  prefer  to  use  an  alternative  cipher  suite  (and  perhaps  reasonably  so  for  performance  reasons).  The  use  of  the  Diffie-­Hellman  key
exchange  does  impose  a  performance  penalty  as  there  is  additional  computation  required  to  derive  the  secret  key.
Using  any  browser's  cipher  suite  preference  order,  at  least  two-­thirds  of  the  SSL  connections  made  in  the  Netcraft  SSL  survey  did  not  use  a  cipher  suite




Date range: 2008-07-21 18:51:07 -- 2008-07-21 23:13:47
Packets analyzed: 91,144 (55.02 MB)
Transports: IPv4 100% 
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1) 192.168.8.0/21 - 6.56 MB (11%) 1) 192.168.8.0/21 - 39.58 MB (71%)
2) 208.111.148.6 - 5.41 MB (9%) 2) 192.168.1.64 - 7.77 MB (14%)

































































1) 80 - 44.78 MB (84%) 1) 80 - 5.85 MB (11%)
2) 443 - 1.82 MB (3%) 2) 39710 - 5.41 MB (10%)
3) 39710 - 178.85 KB (0%) 3) 33148 - 4.44 MB (8%)
One-page visualization of packet flows - Nitroba
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Date range: 1999-03-09 08:00:01 -- 1999-03-10 03:03:20
Packets analyzed: 1,571,748 (373.65 MB)
Transports: IPv4 100% 
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1) 172.16.112.194 - 16.15 MB (4%) 1) 172.16.117.64/26 - 24.91 MB (6%)
2) 172.16.112.100 - 15.86 MB (4%) 2) 172.16.113.105 - 22.98 MB (6%)















































1) 80 - 239.63 MB (65%) 1) 80 - 30.44 MB (8%)
2) 23 - 26.32 MB (7%) 2) 23 - 23.06 MB (6%)
3) 20 - 23.17 MB (6%) 3) 25 - 8.05 MB (2%)
tcpflow 1.5 — wifi support
wifi support provided by Wifipcap
• Open source C++ from CMU 2003
—Jeffrey Pang — Radiotap implementation
—Doug Madory — Wifi Parser
• Implement packet handlers by subclassing








Radiotap information available at TCP level
Per packet information includes:
• channel













Radiotap packet capture is built into MacOS
The legality of clicking the
“Start” button is unclear.
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802.11 link-layer information available at TCP level
Each 802.11 frame has 3 or 4 MACs
• Destination
• Source 
• [Access Point MAC] or [transmitter & receiver]
tcpflow can:
• Produce map of SSIDs to MACs




report.xml will contain a list 802.11 beacons:
(MACs, SSIDs, and counts)
<ssids>
<ssid mac='00:02:13:5c:40:8c' ssid='Super Spfi' count='113'/>
<ssid mac='00:02:13:8d:47:57' ssid='HOTEL' count='770'/>
<ssid mac='00:02:13:d7:45:79' ssid='Michael' count='11'/>
<ssid mac='00:0c:13:28:43:c3' ssid='Janice' count='19'/>
<ssid mac='00:0c:13:4f:43:39' ssid='Michael' count='5'/>
<ssid mac='00:14:13:ce:48:84' ssid='Hunter' count='30'/>
<ssid mac='00:14:13:ce:48:85' ssid='Hunter' count='15'/>
<ssid mac='00:15:13:64:42:13' ssid='linksys' count='126'/>
<ssid mac='00:15:13:64:4f:be' ssid='linksys' count='27'/>
<ssid mac='00:17:13:8a:44:d7' ssid='linksys' count='4'/>
<ssid mac='00:19:13:4b:48:6d' ssid='ZALMOD' count='71'/>
<ssid mac='00:19:13:4b:48:6d' ssid='ZALMOD-SEC' count='71'/>
<ssid mac='00:19:13:00:4d:ac' ssid='Michael' count='19'/>
</ssids>
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plot_wifi_aps.py will transform this into a ‘dot’ output
$ python plot_wifi_aps.py report.xml > report.dot













tcpflow — future improvements
Buffer connections in RAM — Faster
Incorporate ssldump — Decrypt SSL connections (for a while)
Improved visualizations — Useful in the field
Wireshark integration
• Lots of people are using Wireshark
• Use tcpflow to re-implement Wireshark’s “follow TCP connection”





bulk_extractor finds more information, faster than before. 
Version 1.4 significantly improves transformations & feature recognition
New decoders & extractors:
• RAR (extraction & carving)
• Encrypted RAR (carving)
• ZIP (extraction & carving)
• JPEG carving
• XOR (experimental)








• Domain Names; Email addresses; URLs




• ZIP & RAR files; Carved JPEGs; EXIF data
Network Information:
• PCAP files; Ethernet Addresses; 
• TCP/IP Connections; etc.
Information about executables:
• ELF & PE headers; Windows Prefetch files
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       476 Jul  7 23:50 aes_keys.txt
         0 Jul  7 23:48 alerts.txt
      2743 Jul  7 23:59 ccn.txt
       454 Jul  8 00:03 ccn_histogram.txt
         0 Jul  7 23:48 ccn_track2.txt
         0 Jul  8 00:03 ccn_track2_histogram.txt
  23369167 Jul  8 00:03 domain.txt
    185266 Jul  8 00:03 domain_histogram.txt
         0 Jul  7 23:48 elf.txt
   1719842 Jul  8 00:03 email.txt
     35073 Jul  8 00:03 email_histogram.txt
     23961 Jul  8 00:00 ether.txt
       337 Jul  8 00:03 ether_histogram.txt
  11188830 Jul  8 00:03 exif.txt
         0 Jul  7 23:48 find.txt
      1112 Jul  8 00:01 gps.txt
         0 Jul  7 23:48 hex.txt
     95835 Jul  8 00:03 ip.txt
     11603 Jul  8 00:03 ip_histogram.txt
   2025702 Jul  8 00:03 json.txt
         0 Jul  7 23:48 kml.txt
    194991 Jul  8 00:03 packets.pcap
     21343 Jul  8 00:03 report.xml
   3782598 Jul  8 00:03 rfc822.txt
    213746 Jul  8 00:03 tcp.txt
     61255 Jul  8 00:03 tcp_histogram.txt
     59469 Jul  8 00:03 telephone.txt
      6612 Jul  8 00:03 telephone_histogram.txt
  67205326 Jul  8 00:03 url.txt
         0 Jul  8 00:03 url_facebook-id.txt
   5706665 Jul  8 00:03 url_histogram.txt
         0 Jul  8 00:03 url_microsoft-live.txt
      8504 Jul  8 00:03 url_searches.txt
    151673 Jul  8 00:03 url_services.txt
         0 Jul  7 23:48 vcard.txt
  18549729 Jul  8 00:03 windirs.txt
  29051041 Jul  8 00:03 winpe.txt
   1984759 Jul  8 00:03 winprefetch.txt
  34128889 Jul  8 00:03 zip.txt
zip.txt — potential zipfile headers
ZIP has become the defacto archive format.
• zip, jar, docx, pptx, etc.
• ZIP64 provides for files larger than 4GiB
• Allows faster access to components that .tar.gz
bulk_extractor finds “local file headers.”
local file header signature 4 bytes  (0x04034b50)
version needed to extract   2 bytes
general purpose bit flag    2 bytes
compression method          2 bytes
last mod file time          2 bytes
last mod file date          2 bytes
crc-32                      4 bytes
compressed size             4 bytes
uncompressed size           4 bytes
file name length            2 bytes
extra field length          2 bytes
file name                  (variable size)


























  <disposition bytes='10846'>decompressed</disposition></zipinfo>
Notice:
• Original file name & mtime are recovered
You can identify & extract fragments from:
• MSOffice and OpenOffice documents
• Java programs; Android & iPhone applications
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Beverly, Robert, Simson Garfinkel and Greg Cardwell, "Forensic Carving of Network Packets and 
Associated Data Structures", DFRWS 2011, Aug. 1-3, 2011, New Orleans, LA. BEST PAPER AWARD
We hypothesized that binary network data structures were 
present on non-volatile media.
“Binary network data structures” includes:
• Network packets
• Memory structures associated with network connections
We know that binary data are present in RAM.










Approach: use bulk_extractor to find the packets.
We created scan_net. 
• Searches for 
—BPF “pcap” packet headers




• Processed 1817 disk images







In this work, we ask:




u_int ip_v:4, /* version */
ip_hl:4; /* header length */
u_char ip_tos; /* type of service */
u_short ip_len; /* total length */
u_short ip_id; /* identification */
u_short ip_off; /* fragment offset field */
u_char ip_ttl; /* time to live */
u_char ip_p; /* protocol */
u_short ip_sum; /* checksum */
struct in_addr ip_src,ip_dst; /* source and dest address */
}
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Of the 1817 images:
• binary IP addresses: 723 drives (≈40%)
• Average text IP addresses per drive: 2258
• Average binary IP addresses per drive: 21
• Some IP addresses not present in text
—on 66 drives
Information not in the paper:
• Analysis of next-hop MAC address presence.
Binary carving found information not in ASCII
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Author's personal copy
across all operating systems,we are always able to retrieve the
machine’s local IP address. Table 4 shows the precision of
network carving using only high-confidence and all addresses.
We label an IP address as a true positive when it is discovered
and also appears in the captured packet trace. Similarly,
a false positive is one that we discover, but does not appear in
the packet trace. The precision of the validated, high-
confidence addresses is quite high. Not only are the host’s
source IP address and the HTTP transfer destination addresses
discovered, we are typically able to discovermany of the other
machines in the subnet that are sending broadcasts, for
instance Windows file sharing.
4.4. Against real data corpus
Having validated our methodology, we apply our network
carving to 1817 images in the Real Data Corpus (Garfinkel
et al., August 2009). Note that this corpus contains images
from not only general purpose computers, but also from
digital cameras, music players, etc. Specifically, using oper-
ating system inference techniques, 335 images are a version of
Windows. Of the 1817 images, we discover IP addresses on 723
(x40%). Those images in which no IP addresses are found
have been excluded from this analysis.
Unlike the controlled dataset, we have only limited ground
truth over the images in the larger corpus. To ascertain how
representative are these discovered IP addresses, we correlate
them against discovered dotted-quads as represented in
ASCII. We expect some degree of correlation as a host’s
address will often appear in configuration files, logs, caches,
etc. that are found in the natural course of carving by
bulk_extractor.
Fig. 4 shows a scatter plot for the drives. On the typical
drive there are significantly more IP addresses that can be
found from the ASCII than from network carving, and the
number of addresses that correlate varies considerably per
drive.
Notice that there are between one and two orders of
magnitude more IP addresses from ASCII carving than by
network carving. This is not just because network carving
finds relatively few IP addressesdit is because state-of-the-art
ASCII IP address carving techniques search for IP addresses
using regular expressions, and thus generate a significant
number of false positives from software version numbers,
numbers in spreadsheets, and other sources. In contrast
network carving, especially from IP packets with valid
checksums, generates high-quality IP addresses with a negli-
gible false-positive rate.
We find an average of 2258 IP addresses in ASCII and 21 IP
addresses via binary network structure carving per drive
(respectively a standard deviation of 19,635 and 52). On 66 of
the drives, we find validated IP addresses via network carving
that do not appear elsewhere in ASCII form.
For a given image i, let the correlation factor ci be the
fraction of IP addresses found in network structures that are
also found in ASCII form elsewhere in the image. Fig. 5 shows
the cumulative distribution of the 723 images as a function of
c. We analyze two cases, first the correlation factor for all
discovered IPs and second the correlation for IPs with
a frequency greater than one. From the Figure, we see that for
approximately 50% of the images, none of the IP addresses
discovered in network structures are found in ASCII.
However, around 20% of the images have a ci ! 0.2, indi-
cating that for these images of only partially known prove-
nance, there is correlation between our method and
a completely different analysis.
Looking a bit more deeply, we determine the difference in
correlation between IP addresses discovered within IP versus
socket structures. Fig. 6 shows that x53% of images contain
none of the socket addresses elsewhere. However, the corre-
lation is much stronger for addresses discovered within IP
structures where there is some correlation for 74% of the
images. In fact, for IP structures, 50% of the images have
ci ! 0.5, indicating a strong correlation.
Thus, there are high-confidence IP addresses (thosewe find
through correlation between modalities) and lower-
confidence IP addresses (those which are found using
a single modality). Depending on the importance of a disk and
a target, an analyst might go after only the high-confidence IP
addresses or might go after all of them.
Finally, we examine the file source of IP addresses discov-
ered in the corpus. For 10% of the 723 images where we
discovered addresses, one of the IPs was found in the hiber-
fil.sys Windows hibernation file while 2% were in the
Table 4 eWindows 7 ground truth performance.





Fig. 4 e Correlation between scanning modalities across
723 images in the corpus. Each circle corresponds to
a single hard drive, where the X axis indicates the number
of addresses found through binary carving, the Y axis
indicates the number of addresses found by ASCII carving,
and the size of the circle indicates the number of addresses
that are the same.
d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 8 ( 2 0 1 1 ) S 7 8eS 8 9S84
Hibernation decompression found even more packets!
Why we focused on hibernation:
• Network data structures are in system memory
• Memory is stored in hibernation files
• Windows overwrites the beginning of hibernation files when resuming
—But not the whole file!
• Fragments of hibernation files left in unallocated space when windows defragments
• We find an 8-byte XPress compression signature within the compressed memory page 




Opportunistically decompress XPress pages





. . . . . . . . .
Improves recall by an order of magnitude on our test image!
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With cross-drive analysis, we could find drives that had 





Many RDC images bought in batches
We find 16 Ethernet common between images!
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BE 1.3 put MAC addresses in ether.txt and 
ether_histogram.txt files.
342699417       00:80:77:31:01:07       n008077310107 1 00:80:77:31:01:07 192.168.1.2  an
342700437       00:80:77:31:01:07       the following:  00:80:77:31:01:07 brn008077310107
342703371       00:80:77:31:01:07        -s 192.168.1.2 00:80:77:31:01:07   ping 192.168.
559251251       00:80:77:31:01:07       N008077310107 1 00:80:77:31:01:07 192.168.1.2</sp
567912435       00:80:77:31:01:07       class="command">00:80:77:31:01:07   BRN0080773101
684600847       00:80:77:31:01:07        -s 192.168.1.2 00:80:77:31:01:07</span></div><a
6341279242      00:0B:DB:4F:6B:10        (ether_dhost)
6341279242      00:19:E3:E7:5D:23        (ether_shost)
6341283338      00:0B:DB:4F:6B:10        (ether_dhost)
6341283338      00:19:E3:E7:5D:23        (ether_shost)





n=255   00:19:E3:E7:5D:23
n=254   00:0B:DB:4F:6B:10
n=6     00:80:77:31:01:07
n=3     00:80:C7:8F:6C:96
Note:
• Packets clearly traveled from 00:19:E5:E7:5D:23 to 00:0B:DB:4F:6B:10
• Sometimes we found Ethernet addresses in HTML!
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117942521       20.137.78.24    struct ip R (src) cksum-bad
117942521       94.89.93.194    struct ip L (dst) cksum-bad
118342942       20.137.78.24    struct ip R (src) cksum-bad
118342942       94.89.93.194    struct ip L (dst) cksum-bad
9977306594      192.168.1.1     sockaddr_in
9977393926      63.245.209.93   sockaddr_in
5839793854-HIBER-17952268       90.4.162.232    struct ip L (dst) cksum-bad
5839793854-HIBER-17960460       78.0.3.185      struct ip R (src) cksum-bad
5839793854-HIBER-17960460       90.4.162.232    struct ip L (dst) cksum-bad
6339825268      192.168.1.104   struct ip L (src) cksum-ok
6339825268      192.168.1.1     struct ip R (dst) cksum-ok
6339825320      192.168.1.104   struct ip L (src) cksum-ok
5839793854-HIBER-129985200      8.3.2.3 sockaddr_in
• Local (“L”) or Remote (“R”)
• chksum-bad/chksum-ok — IP checksum good or bad
• sockaddr_in — IP address from sockaddr_in structure.
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ip_histogram.txt removes random noise
(1.3 histogram is only of chksum-ok values)




n=93    108.5.218.9
n=93    7.90.102.193
n=64    20.137.78.24
n=64    94.89.93.194
n=31    176.69.248.3
n=30    5.225.0.252
n=26    120.23.102.15
n=26    182.210.102.137
n=24    152.6.0.164
n=24    152.6.0.220
n=19    192.168.1.1
n=14    192.168.1.104
n=13    141.77.252.81
n=13    80.4.139.6
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In 2012, scan_net was expanded to create pcap files
“pcap” files are much easier to process.
• Provides entire packet (ip.txt gave the offset of the packet in the disk image.)
• Process with existing tools: Wireshark, tcpflow, tcpdump,...
• Include timestamp metadata for each packet (for those from pcap files)
Two sources of packets:
• Ethernet or IP packet in memory.
• PCAP file on the drive
—Someone was running a sniffer?
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scan_netinput
IP addresses pcap files
pcap files are a common file format for packets.
There are many tools for analyzing pcap files.
$ tcpdump -r packets.pcap 
-5:-59:-59.0000 IP 192.168.1.1.microsoft-ds > 192.168.1.104.udpradio: Flags [.], ack 
416616880, win 65535, length 0
-5:-59:-59.0000 IP 192.168.1.1.microsoft-ds > 192.168.1.104.udpradio: Flags [.], ack 
4294967234, win 65535, length 0
-5:-59:-59.0000 IP 192.168.1.1.microsoft-ds > 192.168.1.104.udpradio: Flags [.], ack 
4294967084, win 65535, length 0
-5:-59:-59.0000 IP 192.168.1.1.microsoft-ds > 192.168.1.104.udpradio: Flags [P.], seq 
4294966956:4294967060, ack 4294967008, win 65535, length 104SMB PACKET: SMBtrans2 
(REPLY)
...
Notice time is -5:-59:-59.000 
• This has a time zone of -0600 (I’m typing this in Utah in the summer)
• The time in the packet file is “1” 
/* Possibly a valid ethernet frame but not preceded by a 
 * pcap_record_header.                                         
 * Write it out with time of 1.                                
 */
• Only packets carved from a PCAP file will have a the correct time.
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PCAP carving takes advantage of the headers.










We find a lot of packets on disks!
August 2013 study of bulk_extractor on corpus.
• Total disks processed: 2418









Example of packets from IN4001-1026:
Sample UDP
-5:00:00.000000 IP 10.48.231.2.hsrp > 
               all-routers.mcast.net.hsrp: 
      HSRPv0-hello 20: state=active group=5 addr=10.48.231.1
Sample TCP:
-5:00:00.000000 IP 10.48.133.228.http > 10.48.231.44.chip-lm: 
Flags [.], seq 6301:7561, ack 763, win 65535, length 1260
Note:
• Time -5:00:00, so these packets came from memory, not a carved PCAP file.
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Packets in file 204,202
UDP packets 93,130
TCP packets 111,039
The big picture: 
using low-probability data for high-outcome correlation.
bulk_extractor was created to find low-probably, high-value information.




—Evidence of specific executables  (prefetch files; PE headers)
Once found, the goal was to enable:
• Multi-drive correlation
—Find all drives with a specific identifier
—“Blind correlation” between multiple drives to find identifiers in common
We now have more sources of low-probability data:
• Fragments from ZIP & RAR files




• Fast offline reassembly of TCP streams
• Handles many common situations
• Wifi (radiotap & 802.11) support
• Easy workflow integration
• Does not decrypt SSL
bulk_extractor 1.4:
• Carves ZIP and RAR fragments into files
• Carves encrypted RAR files
• Carves IP packets and PCAP fragments into PCAP files
Contact information: slgarfin@nps.edu ; gdgarsl@dodiis.ic.gov
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TCP
flow
